Employment Division V SmithEdit
Employment Division v. Smith (1990) is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that clarified how the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment interacts with neutral laws of general applicability. In a 6-3 ruling written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a state may enforce a generally applicable law even when its application burdens religious practice, so long as the law is neutral and not specifically aimed at a particular religion. The case emerged from Oregon's unemployment compensation system, which denied benefits to two workers who had used peyote as part of a religious ceremony in the Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division argued that the use of peyote violated a state drug law and therefore constituted misconduct incompatible with receiving benefits. The Court sided with the state, replacing the narrower Sherbert/Yoder framework with a more antiseptic neutrality standard that prioritizes uniform application of laws over carve-outs for religious practice. The decision remains central to debates over how much the government should defer to religious practice when enforcing general public policies. First Amendment Free Exercise Clause Sherbert v. Verner Wisconsin v. Yoder Peyote Native American Church unemployment benefits Oregon Employment Division v. Smith
Background
- Parties and facts: The plaintiff workers, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were members of the Native American Church who used peyote as part of their religious ceremonies. Oregon's Employment Division denied them unemployment benefits after determining their peyote use amounted to misconduct under state law. The case moved through Oregon courts and eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court as Employment Division v. Smith.
- The legal trigger: Oregon treated the illicit use of peyote as illegal drug use and, under its rules on unemployment benefits, as misconduct that disqualified a claimant. The specific statutory framework defined disqualification for workers who engaged in illegal activity, and the state argued that the peyote use fell squarely within that category.
- Religious practice in tension with public policy: The Native American Church has a long-standing practice centered on peyote as a sacrament in certain ceremonies. Advocates for the workers argued that requiring exemptions in this context would compel participation in a religious rite only by abandoning the state’s general rule.
Legal framework and questions
- Free Exercise Clause: The case lives in the long-running dialogue over the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The key question was whether a neutral law of general applicability could be enforced even when its application burdens religious practice. See Free Exercise Clause.
- General applicability and neutrality: The Court focused on whether the law burdening the practice was neutral and generally applicable, i.e., whether it did not target religion and applied to all people in similar circumstances. For years, the Court had applied a stricter standard in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, which emphasized exemptions for religious exercise under certain conditions. The Smith decision pivoted toward a general-applicability approach.
- Relationship to earlier cases: Sherbert and Yoder had been cited as foundations for more robust protection of religious exercise, sometimes triggering strict scrutiny when free exercise was burdened. Sherbert v. Verner Wisconsin v. Yoder The Smith majority argued that those decisions do not control when the law is neutral and generally applicable to everyone, regardless of religious belief. The Court thus narrowed the path to obtaining exemptions from otherwise neutral laws.
The decision
- The majority opinion: Justice Scalia authored the opinion for a majority of the Court. The ruling held that Oregon could enforce its unemployment law without providing an exemption for peyote use arising from religious practice, so long as the law was neutral and generally applicable. The decision stressed the importance of uniform law enforcement and warned against creating a mosaic of exemptions that could undermine the predictability and stability of public policy.
- What this meant in practice: The decision meant that individuals could not claim a religious exemption from a neutral, broadly applicable law simply because the law incidentally burdened their religious exercise. In other words, the government can apply general rules—even when those rules affect religious conduct—so long as the rules are not tailored to target religion and are applied evenly to all citizens.
- Dissenting voices: Critics of the ruling argued that the decision eroded religious liberty by allowing state laws to trump sincere religious practice in a way that the Court had previously protected. They warned that the standard risked turning religious exercise into a second-class liberty when pitted against the public interest in enforcing laws. The dissenters emphasized that restrictions on conscience in this manner could chill protected religious activity.
Aftermath and ongoing debates
- Legislative response: The Smith decision spurred legislative and judicial efforts to restore stronger protections for religious exercise. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Religious Freedom Restoration Act or RFRA) was enacted in 1993 to reinstate the requirement that the government demonstrate a compelling interest and use the least-restrictive means when a law substantially burdened religious exercise, at least when applied to federal laws. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
- Limitations on RFRA: The 1997 Supreme Court decision in Boerne v. Flores held that RFRA could not be applied to the states in the way Congress had enacted it, limiting RFRA's scope to federal actions and providing a framework for future debate about state-level protections. Boerne v. Flores
- RFRA's later developments: In some later cases, RFRA was invoked to protect religious liberty in the federal sphere and in the private sector (e.g., certain for-profit entities), illustrating how the underlying tensions between neutral laws and religious practice continued to shape constitutional and statutory interpretation. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal Hobby Lobby Stores v. Burwell
- Tribal and religious liberty implications: The Smith decision raised questions about how it affected indigenous religious practices tied to specific cultural and ceremonial norms. Proponents of a robust protection for such practices argued that RFRA and related developments were necessary to guard minority religious expressions, while supporters of Smith argued that uniform rules across society are essential for legal predictability and equality before the law. Native American Church Peyote