Article 368Edit
Article 368 sits at the heart of India’s constitutional architecture. It is the clause that empowers Parliament to amend the Constitution itself, while also prescribing the checks and balances that keep those changes legitimate and durable. In practice, this means the Constitution can adapt to new economic realities, social needs, and political developments, but only through a process that requires broad consensus. That combination—elasticity with restraint—has been a stabilizing force in Indian governance, one that a prudent center-right observer would note protects both responsible reform and the essential framework of the republic.
From a pragmatic standpoint, Article 368 is less about granting a blank check to the legislature and more about preserving a workable balance between change and continuity. Amendments have reshaped the constitutional order in important ways (for instance, to reflect shifts in economic policy, social policy, or federal arrangements), yet the mechanism insists on a wide base of support. The provision that certain amendments require ratification by states serves as a federalizing brake on centralized overreach. This is not a nostalgia motion for the past; it is a design feature intended to prevent quick, factional rewrites that could undermine long-term governance. For many observers, that is the right kind of constitutional design: flexible enough to reform, robust enough to endure.
This topic also intersects with the high-level judicial guardrails that accompany constitutional reform. The Supreme Court’s articulation of the basic structure doctrine, most famously in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, holds that no amendment can alter the essential features that give the Constitution its character—such as republicanism, secular governance, and federal structure. In simple terms, Parliament can change the Constitution, but not the things that define what the Constitution is. This doctrine acts as a safety valve against changes that would erase the framework that has supported India’s democratic evolution. See, for example, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and the surrounding jurisprudence on basic structure doctrine.
The text and procedure of Article 368, its interaction with the judiciary, and its historical applications give rise to several well-worn debates. Supporters—typically those who favor a strong, reform-oriented center with limited but real constraints on unilateral change—argue that the process ensures reforms are thoughtful and broadly accepted. They point to moments when Parliament used its amending power to modernize the Constitution in ways that facilitated growth and governance, while still respecting essential principles embodied in the basic structure. Critics, often from more egalitarian or liberal strands, argue that the combination of a two-thirds parliamentary requirement and state ratification can be slow and juridically constrained. From this vantage, the fear is that reforms needed to keep pace with science, technology, or social change are too easily blocked by institutional inertia. Proponents respond that resilience and legitimacy come from consensus, not from speed or majority capture.
A related controversy concerns the balance between legislative sovereignty and judicial review. The center-right argument emphasizes that a constitution must be the product of political processes and elected representatives rather than a court-driven project. The basic structure doctrine, while a powerful check on arbitrary rewrites, is also a reminder that the Constitution’s identity matters. Critics who label the doctrine as anti-democratic or overreaching overlook the practical point that a republic depends on durable guarantees that protect core features from shifting political fashion. In this sense, the doctrine is a guardrail against the kind of revolutionary amendments that could destabilize political and economic order.
Practical examples illuminate these debates. The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 and the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 are often cited in discussions of Article 368’s operation and its limits. The former refined procedures for amendment in light of evolving political realities, while the latter removed the fundamental right to property as a direct right, reconfiguring it as a directive principle—an emblem of how reform can recalibrate constitutional guarantees without destroying the framework. Other amendments—such as those that expanded or clarified the role of the states in amending the Constitution—illustrate the continuing relevance of state ratification as a check on centralized power. See Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 and Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 for detailed histories, and consider how these changes interact with the ideas in Article 368.
In the broader sweep, Article 368 is a tool that, when used prudently, supports both the rule of law and the capacity of a large, diverse democracy to reform itself without losing its essential features. The debate over how free the amending power should be—and where to draw the line between legitimate reform and structural overreach—reflects enduring questions about sovereignty, federalism, and the pace of change. The right of a nation to adapt its founding document while preserving its core commitments is, in practical political terms, a test of governance more than a test of ideology.