An Enquiry Concerning The Principles Of MoralsEdit
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is a foundational text in moral philosophy, penned by David Hume and published as a concise follow-up to his broader psychological inquiries. The work presents a naturalistic account of how people form moral judgments, centering on human sentiment, social life, and the practical needs of communities. Rather than locating morality in abstract reason or divine command, Hume argues that morality arises from how human beings feel about actions and dispositions when they observe them in others. This emphasis on sentiment, utility, and social cohesion would later influence a broad tradition—from liberal reform to conservative governance—by underscoring the importance of established customs, predictable rules, and the everyday workings of sympathy among citizens. See An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals for the primary text and A Treatise of Human Nature for the broader psychological context Hume develops in his earlier work.
From a practical, order-oriented vantage point, the Enquiry illuminates how moral life serves the maintenance of civil society. The central claim is not that rules are timeless absolutes, but that they are validated by their ability to promote harmony, cooperation, and stability within a community. Moral distinctions—such as what counts as virtue or vice—emerge from feelings of approbation or blame that observers have toward the character and conduct of others. The work repeatedly ties moral approval to social usefulness: actions that tend to secure the welfare of the group, or that support reliable cooperation, are more readily praised. See Moral philosophy and Moral sense theory for connected discussions of how moral judgments arise from sentiment rather than formal deduction.
The work and its context
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals distills a number of themes from Hume’s broader empirical program. It treats morals as a product of human nature and social life rather than a set of deduced propositions. The argument interacts with several strands of thought:
- The primacy of moral sentiment: moral judgments depend on how observers feel about actions and dispositions, rather than on abstract rules alone. See Sympathy (David Hume) and Moral sense theory.
- The social function of virtue: virtues are valuable because they promote cooperation, trust, and the smooth functioning of communities. See Justice (philosophy) and Property.
- The idea of artificial virtues: some moral qualities arise from conventions and agreements that coordinate behavior in a regular society. See Artificial virtue.
- The role of habit and custom: long-standing norms shape what a given culture considers virtuous or blameworthy. See Habit and Custom.
In discussing these ideas, Hume also engages with the limits of reason as a guiding force for morality. Reason can illuminate means, but it cannot grant motive—that role belongs to the passions and the sentiments shaped by experience and social life. See A Treatise of Human Nature for the larger project, and Reason and Emotion in moral psychology for related debates.
Core ideas
Moral sentiments and sympathy
At the heart of the Enquiry is the claim that moral distinctions spring from our sentiments. When we approve of a character trait or a conduct, it is because it excites in us a feeling of pleasure, pleasure in the virtue of the agent, or disapproval when we take offense at a vice. This sympathy—the capacity to feel with others—helps bind members of a community. See Sympathy (David Hume); see also Moral psychology for broader context about how emotions guide judgment.
Utility, social welfare, and the grounds of praise
Virtue and vice are measured by their consequences for social life. Actions that contribute to the common good, or that bolster the prospects of mutual advantage, receive praise and encouragement. Conversely, conduct that undermines trust, reputation, or cooperative schemes tends to be criticized. This emphasis on social utility links morality to the maintenance of peaceful, productive communities. See Utilitarianism (as a later development) and Justice (philosophy) for related notions of how public welfare informs moral appraisal.
Justice as an artificial virtue
Hume argues that certain virtues—most notably justice—are not natural to human beings in a vacuum but arise from conventions that regulate behavior for the sake of social cooperation. For example, the recognition of property rights and contractual obligations emerges because stable arrangements enable people to rely on what others will do. These are “artificial” in the sense that they require shared rules and institutions to function; their legitimacy rests on their utility to social order. See Justice (philosophy) and Property.
Habit, custom, and the stability of moral order
Customs and habits shape moral expectations over time. Recurrent approval of beneficial patterns reinforces them, while persistent disapproval punishes deviations. In this way, societies accumulate a body of practices that guide behavior even when explicit deliberation is scarce. See Habit and Custom.
Religion, superstition, and moral life
Hume treats religious belief as part of the moral economy of a culture, contributing to shared sentiments and sometimes reinforcing social norms. Yet he remains skeptical about arguments that moral truth rests on supernatural authority alone. See Religion and Ethics for connected discussions about the interplay between belief, sentiment, and moral guidance.
Application and reception
The Enquiry’s insistence that morality rests in sentiment and social utility has made it influential across a spectrum of intellectual and political currents. In liberal and conservative thought alike, the idea that durable institutions—property rules, contracts, and predictable sanctions—support human flourishing has been valued. The emphasis on cooperation and social order lends itself to arguments for a stable rule of law, prudent governance, and measured reform, rather than radical upheaval.
Critics have pressed various objections. Some rationalist and religious moralists argue that sentiments can be biased or parochial, failing to offer universal criteria for right and wrong. Others contend that the Enquiry underestimates the role of rights and duties that precede communal agreement, or that it allows social arrangements to justify injustice if they are useful in the short term. See Rationalism (philosophy) and Rights for related debates.
From a right-of-center lens, the Enquiry can be read as a natural ally of institutions that stabilize society: property, contracts, and the slow evolution of public norms. Proponents argue that these mechanisms are not mere conveniences but moral bridges that enable individuals to pursue prosperity without resorting to coercion. They may also point to the Enquiry’s emphasis on prudence, long-term welfare, and the value of social solidarity as reasons to defend traditional governance structures against rapid, ill-considered reform. Critics who insist that morality must be founded on abstract rights or universal principles may characterize Hume as endorsing the status quo; defenders counter that the work’s emphasis on shared sentiment and social utility does not deny reform, but grounds it in the realities of human cooperation. See Natural law and Conservatism for related discussions.
The Enquiry also interacts with later moral theory. It prefigures aspects of Utilitarianism in its attention to the consequences of actions for social welfare, while its emphasis on sentiment and social harmony resonates with later theories of the moral sense. The work’s legacy is visible in ongoing discussions about how best to cultivate virtuous citizens within any political order, and how best to balance tradition with prudence in policy and law. See Bentham and Mill for the utilitarian lineage, and Moral philosophy for broader doctrinal context.
On racial and historical critiques, some readers note that Hume’s writings reflect the biases of his era, including remarks about race that modern standards rightly condemn. These elements are generally acknowledged as part of the historical context rather than essential to the core moral psychology the Enquiry develops. Critics from various directions have used such passages to challenge the source material, while contemporaries and later readers often separate the enduring insights about sentiment, habit, and social coordination from problematic statements of the time. See Race and philosophy and Racism for related considerations.