The Theory Of Moral SentimentsEdit
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759, is one of the cornerstone works in the history of moral philosophy. Written by the Scottish thinker Adam Smith, it proposes that human beings judge actions primarily through sympathy—an instinct to understand and share the feelings of others. This social psychology grounds moral life in ordinary, everyday relations rather than in abstract commandments or purely rational calculations. The central mechanism for moral evaluation is the imagined judgment of an internal audience, the Impartial spectator, which helps individuals regulate conduct in light of propriety, virtue, and the welfare of others. Through this lens, Smith treats moral life as deeply embedded in social life, conversation, and custom, rather than a sterile exercise of self-interest alone.
The work also anticipates later liberal themes by showing how private affections and social norms sustain public order, constrain vice, and foster cooperative behavior in communities. Although it is a companion to Smith’s later political economy in The Wealth of Nations, The Theory of Moral Sentiments stands on its own as a serious account of how people form conscience, how reputation shapes action, and how a society of interdependent individuals can prosper when mutual sentiment and restraint guide behavior. The book has influenced debates about virtue, law, religion, and the proper balance between individual liberty and social obligation, and it remains a touchstone for discussions of ethics in a market society. Adam Smith
Overview
The core claim is that moral judgments arise from a capacity for sympathy—the ability to perceive and feel with others. This is not mere sentimentality; it is a cognitive and affective mechanism that allows people to gauge the appropriateness of their conduct.
A key institutional idea is the Impartial spectator, an imagined observer who evaluates actions as if from a perspective that is fair, detached, and concerned with the welfare of others. This imagined standard fosters self-control and steadiness of character.
Smith distinguishes between propriety and fitness in social behavior. Propriety refers to what is appropriate within a given situation, while virtue encompasses stable dispositions such as benevolence, justice, and prudence. A person’s moral character develops as their sentiments align with an ever-clearer sense of virtuous conduct.
The moral economy is social as much as personal. Reputation, public opinion, and reciprocal expectations help to regulate behavior, sometimes more effectively than explicit coercion. Laws operate alongside these moral sentiments, reinforcing norms and providing a framework for resolving disputes.
The book treats moral life as compatible with, and indeed supportive of, economic activity. Human beings are motivated by a blend of sympathy, self-interest, and social regard, a combination that makes coordinated action possible—whether in families, guilds, or markets. The intertwined concerns of personal virtue and public welfare foreshadow themes that Smith would later explore in The Wealth of Nations.
Core concepts
Sympathy and fellow-feeling
- Humans naturally imagine themselves in others’ situations, producing a shared sense of right and wrong. This capacity enables ordinary people to discipline their own passions without waiting for external penalties. Sympathy
The impartial spectator
- The inner judge that helps people measure the propriety of their desires and actions. The spectator’s standards are not fixed; they evolve with culture, experience, and conversation within a community. This intermediate authority allows for moral development without reliance on a single, external creed. Impartial spectator
Propriety, virtue, and self-command
- Propriety concerns fitting behavior for a given context; virtue includes benevolence, justice, temperance, and prudence. Self-command, or self-control, arises when one chooses to align passions with the dictates of the impartial observer, even when instant gratification beckons. Virtue Justice Prudence
Self-interest tempered by sympathy
- While Smith acknowledges self-interest as a real motive, he argues that sympathy naturally checks excess and channels self-love toward socially productive ends. This creates a moral economy in which private motives contribute to the common good rather than undermine it. Self-interest
Reputation and social sanction
- Personal reputation depends on others’ judgments, which in turn shape future actions. This social ecology of praise and blame helps maintain civil order and trust, essential for both family life and commercial exchange. Reputation
The social nature of justice and benevolence
- Justice is not merely a legal category but a moral sentiment rooted in the regard for others’ rights and welfare. Benevolence extends beyond strict duty, enriching social bonds and stabilizing communities. Justice Benevolence
The role of religion, custom, and habit
The economy and moral life
- Smith’s portrait of moral sentiments does not oppose commerce; rather, it explains how markets function within a framework of social norms. The cultivation of sympathy helps justify voluntary cooperation, while laws and institutions protect property and enforce contracts. The Wealth of Nations
Controversies and debates
Universality vs parochial sentiment
- Critics have asked whether sympathy can be truly universal in a plural world, or whether it remains tilted toward the concerns of one’s own circle. Proponents contend that the impartial spectator helps abstract beyond parochial interests, but critics worry that biased sentiments can still shape judgments, especially in hierarchical societies.
Relationship to utilitarian and rationalist theories
- The Theory of Moral Sentiments sits alongside Smith’s later economic writings but diverges from strictly utilitarian or rationalist ethics. It grounds morality in sentiment and social feedback rather than in a calculation of overall happiness or purely abstract principles. This has made the work attractive to liberal and conservative readers who favor moral sentiment and social cohesion over abstract maximization.
Gender, race, and social hierarchy
- Some modern readers critique the work for ideas that today appear to mirror conventional hierarchies or to presuppose gendered social roles embedded in eighteenth-century life. Defenders argue that Smith’s framework is flexible enough to analyze moral development across cultures and institutions, and that the central claim about sympathy and the impartial spectator speaks to universal aspects of human nature, while recognizing historical particularities.
Limits of moral psychology in addressing injustice
- A perennial debate concerns whether a theory grounded in sentiment can adequately address structural injustice or large-scale inequalities. Supporters maintain that shared moral sentiment and public opinion can drive reform and that law interacts with virtue to reduce abuses. Critics note that sentiment alone may fail to compensate victims or to challenge entrenched power structures, arguing for stronger institutional protections and rights-based frameworks alongside moral sentiment.
The politics of a market society
- For supporters of civil liberty and limited government, The Theory of Moral Sentiments provides a foundation for social harmony without heavy-handed state intervention. Critics of a purely market-based reading contend that trust, property rights, and legal order must be anchored in robust civic institutions and fair policies, not merely in internalized sentiment. The dialogue between these positions continues to shape debates about regulation, welfare, and constitutional arrangements.