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T1114 TranslocationEdit

T1114 Translocation is a technique cataloged in the MITRE ATT&CK framework that describes how an intruder moves a foothold, payload, or command from one host to another within a network. Rather than relying solely on breaking perimeters, adversaries increasingly leverage existing trust, shared services, and legitimate administration tools to propagate across machines. This form of movement is a core facet of lateral movement, expanding an attacker’s reach once initial access is gained and enabling the deployment of additional tools, persistence mechanisms, or data exfiltration.

In practice, translocation is about digital traversal within an environment. It emphasizes the exploit of routine network operations, file sharing, and remote management workflows to push code or instructions across hosts. Because the movement often uses ordinary, sanctioned utilities and protocols, it can be difficult for defenders to distinguish between benign admin activity and malicious translocation without detailed telemetry and baseline behavior. See MITRE ATT&CK for the taxonomy and the specific technique entry Translocation within the broader lateral movement landscape.

Overview of the technique

Translocation is not a single exploit but a category of behaviors that enable an attacker to reach additional machines after compromising one host. Key characteristics include:

  • Use of legitimate tools and services to move laterally rather than relying solely on bespoke malware.
  • Movement via remote file copies, remote execution, or remote management channels, often within standard administrative workflows.
  • Propagation paths that may involve multiple steps and various network protocols, increasing the potential attack surface.

In many campaigns, translocation is paired with other techniques such as credential access, process injection, or the deployment of a second stage payload on a new host. The effect is a broader foothold in an environment and a diminished need for rapid rapid-fire exploitation of new vulnerabilities.

Vectors and implementation

Translocation can occur through several common mechanisms, often chosen for their reliability in Windows and mixed-OS networks. Examples include:

  • Remote File Copy and Shared Folders: Adversaries copy payloads or scripts to remote hosts using file shares or network shares, then execute them from the target. See Remote File Copy and SMB in context with lateral movement.
  • Remote Command Execution: Tools that issue commands on remote systems to trigger execution of a payload, such as using remote shells or administrative protocols.
  • WMI and WinRM: Windows management channels can be leveraged to run commands, copy files, or execute payloads on other machines within the domain.
  • PSExec and Other Admin Tools: Publicly documented and widely used utilities can serve as efficient conduits for moving code across hosts.
  • RDP and Other Remote Access Channels: When misused, remote access sessions can become conduits for uploading code to a second system.
  • Living off the Land: A broader pattern where legitimate built-in tools (for example, PowerShell or system utilities) are repurposed to facilitate movement, often with minimal new binary artifacts.

These vectors are not mutually exclusive, and sophisticated intrusions may blend several techniques in sequence to move from an initial foothold to more valuable targets. See PowerShell, WMI, PSExec, RDP, and the concept Living off the land for related material.

Detection and mitigation

Defenders focus on visibility into cross-host activity and the abuse of administrative pathways. Practical steps include:

  • Telemetry and logging: Collect and correlate logs from endpoints, servers, and network devices to identify unusual cross-host file transfers, remote executions, or credential use across multiple machines. Look for anomalies in Windows Event Logs and related logging sources that accompany remote operations.
  • Network segmentation and least privilege: Limit where administrative credentials can be used, segment critical assets, and restrict administrative shares. Enforce MFA for remote administration and tighten firewall rules around management ports.
  • Hardened configurations: Disable or tightly control public administrative shares, turn off unnecessary remote services, and apply least-privilege principles to service accounts and admin groups.
  • Endpoint protection and EDR: Deploy solutions capable of detecting unusual remote operations, atypical use of admin tools, or script-based activity that precedes or accompanies translocation.
  • Operational discipline: Use established change-control processes for deployment across hosts, and monitor for unexpected propagation patterns in routine maintenance windows.

Controversies and debates

In the broader security community, discussions around technique classification and defense strategy often surface. Some analysts advocate for sharper scoping within the ATT&CK taxonomy to reduce ambiguity between legitimate administrative activity and malicious translocation, arguing that clearer taxonomies improve real-time detection and reduce alert fatigue. Others emphasize the practical reality that attackers adapt quickly, so defense focuses on behavior-based detection and defense-in-depth rather than relying on any single technique taxonomy. The ongoing debate about optimal detection strategies frequently centers on balancing comprehensive visibility with the cost and complexity of instrumentation, a topic that remains active in industry forums and standards discussions.

See also