Start IiEdit
START II was a bilateral effort between the United States and the Russian Federation to take a significant step in reducing strategic offensive arms after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Signed in 1993 by leaders seeking a safer strategic environment, the agreement aimed to build on the framework of START I by deepening reductions and constraining certain categories of ICBMs. In practice, however, START II never entered into force, and its ambitions were overtaken by later arms-control developments and geopolitical shifts. The treaty remains a touchstone in discussions about how far the great powers should go in scaling back nuclear forces while preserving credible deterrence.
The treaty's core intent was twofold: to reduce the armored weight of the strategic force and to eliminate the most destabilizing features of the postwar arsenals. One of its most notable provisions would have prohibited the deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ICBMs, a feature that had allowed a single missile to target many cities or military assets. In addition, START II sought to drive further cuts in deployed strategic warheads and to cement a path toward deeper reductions in subsequent negotiations. For readers who want the historical context, START I set the transatlantic baseline and verification mechanisms that were to be built upon, with the aspiration that negotiated limits would reduce incentives for a costly arms race and increase predictability between Washington and Moscow. See START I for background on the previous phase of this process, and Russia and United States as the principal parties to the agreement.
Provisions and scope
- MIRV ban on ICBMs: START II would have curtailed or eliminated the deployment of MIRVs on intercontinental ballistic missiles, a move intended to simplify the strategic landscape and make arms control more verifiable.
- Deployed strategic warheads: The treaty envisioned significant reductions in the number of deployed strategic warheads, reflecting a shared preference for fewer, more secure weapons rather than dozens of independently targeting warheads.
- Verification framework: As with other arms-control efforts, verification was a central feature, designed to provide confidence that both sides were meeting the agreed limits. The challenge of verification in the post–Soviet environment was a recurring theme for proponents and critics alike.
- Timeline and force structure: The agreement contemplated a path toward further reductions over time, with the expectation that successive rounds would be negotiated to respond to changes in the geopolitical landscape, including the evolution of missile defenses and strategic doctrines.
For readers who want more detail on the treaty’s technical and political specifics, see Intercontinental ballistic missiles, Nuclear weapons, and Missile defense discussions. The treaty sits within a lineage that includes START I and the broader Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that has shaped U.S.–Russia discussions on strategic arms for decades.
Strategic rationale
Supporters argued that START II would have contributed to strategic stability by: - Reducing incentives for a rapid, destabilizing nuclear buildup and encouraging more deliberate decision-making in crisis scenarios. - Limiting one of the most destabilizing features of late–Cold War arsenals (MIRVs) to create a simpler, more transparent force structure. - Providing a platform for future reductions that would align with broader security interests, including the defense of allies and the integrity of NATO and other security commitments. - Encouraging modernization focused on reliability and survivability rather than merely increasing the count of warheads.
Critics pointed to the uncertainties of verification, the difficulty of maintaining credible deterrence with fewer deployed weapons, and the risk that a party might cheat or abandon commitments if political will waned. In a broader sense, the debate touched on whether deep reductions should precede or accompany advances in missile defenses and whether reductions should be bound to reciprocal steps or conditioned on allied security concerns and regional stability.
For those studying how arms-control theory interfaces with practice, see Deterrence theory and Verification regime. The balance between reducing risk and maintaining a credible deterrent has long been a central debate in strategic policy, with START II playing a key role in illustrating how that balance is argued in political forums.
Controversies and debates
- Verification and compliance: Critics questioned whether the verification mechanisms could be robust and timely enough to deter cheating. Proponents argued that a credible verification regime would be essential to any deep reductions, and that without verified compliance, reductions could undermine deterrence rather than enhance it.
- Missile defenses: A major debate centered on how reductions would interact with missile-defense plans. Some argued that deep reductions were incompatible with future defensive needs or would undermine the strategic advantage of the United States and its allies. Others claimed that credible arms reductions could coexist with robust defenses, so long as each side remained vigilant about verification.
- Strategic stability and alliance commitments: Questions arose about how far reductions should go in the context of alliance defense guarantees and growing regional threats. Supporters maintained that reductions could strengthen long-term stability if tied to verified compliance and to a broader security framework; critics worried about the potential erosion of deterrence if reductions outpaced the technological and industrial capacity to sustain a credible force.
- Political and legislative obstacles: In the United States, Senate ratification and domestic political dynamics were in play. The treaty’s fate highlighted how arms-control efforts are as much about geopolitics and political capital as about technical feasibility.
From a practical standpoint, observers note that START II’s lack of entry into force did not end the conversation on arms control. It influenced later negotiating strategies and framed what many governments sought in subsequent agreements, including updates and replacements that could reflect new strategic realities without sacrificing a credible deterrent. See New START for how the United States and Russia pursued a more modern set of limits in a changed security environment, and read about the ABM Treaty and its role in shaping missile-defense discussions.
Legacy and relevance today
Although START II did not enter into force, its aims influenced subsequent arms-control thinking and the ongoing effort to balance arms reductions with reliable deterrence. The broader arc—from START I through START II to later arrangements—illustrates how parties seek to reduce risk while contending with evolving military technologies and regional threats. The later New START treaty, for instance, reflects continuing interest in holding strategic forces to defined limits, even as contingencies involving missile defenses, allied security, and technological modernization evolve.
The debates surrounding START II continue to inform discussions about how far major powers should go in reducing nuclear arsenals, how to verify compliance, and how to maintain strategic stability in a world of shifting alliances and new military capabilities. See also Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and SALT II for related chapters in the history of U.S.–Russia arms control, and NPT for the broader global framework governing nuclear weapons.