Influence OperationsEdit

Influence operations are deliberate efforts to shape the beliefs, emotions, or actions of a target audience by carefully orchestrating information, narratives, and messaging. They aim to influence political outcomes, public policy, social attitudes, or trust in institutions without relying on overt coercion. In the digital age, influence operations can be carried out by states, non-state actors, political campaigns, corporations, or other actors, and they commonly blend formal messaging with covert or deceptive methods. Techniques include disinformation, manipulation of data or imagery, the use of inauthentic accounts or personas, and the strategic amplification of messages through networks and platforms. See for example influence operation and information operation as overlapping concepts in practice, as well as disinformation and propaganda in the broader information ecosystem.

In contemporary practice, influence operations span borders and audiences, from foreign publics to domestic voters, and from policymakers to opinion leaders. They exploit vulnerabilities in media ecosystems—such as confirmation bias, social media algorithms, and the speed of online discussion—to produce effects at scale. The actors involved range from national security services and state-backed entities to political action committees, commercial firms, and activist networks. While some efforts are openly framed as strategic communications, many rely on deception, inauthenticity, or covert funding to avoid attribution. See Internet Research Agency for a widely cited example of a state-linked operation, and United Front Work Department for a related practice in another major actor.

Definitions and scope

influence operation: influence operation; a coordinated effort to sway perceptions and behavior of a target audience.
information operation: information operation; a broader term that encompasses the control and dissemination of information to influence outcomes.
disinformation: disinformation; false or misleading information shared to deceive.
misinformation: misinformation; incorrect information spread unintentionally or without malicious intent.
propaganda: propaganda; biased or misleading information used to promote a political cause.
strategic communications: strategic communications; organized messaging designed to advance specific objectives, sometimes blending persuasion with public diplomacy.
inauthentic behavior: sockpuppet or sockpuppet accounts; fake or deceptive online personas used to simulate broad support or disagreement.
bots: bot; automated accounts used to amplify messages or create the appearance of consensus.
astroturfing: astroturfing; the masking of covert activity as if it were grassroots support.
foreign influence operations: foreign influence operations; efforts by actors outside a country to shape its politics or policy.

Actors and techniques

state actors: Governments and their security or intelligence wings may run influence campaigns to deter rivals, project power, or tilt policy conversations. Notable examples discussed in the literature include operations linked to Russia and the United Front Work Department of the People’s Republic of China, among others. See Russia and China entries for broader context.
non-state actors: Political campaigns, interest groups, or commercial firms may deploy influence techniques—sometimes legally, sometimes with deniable or covert aspects. Astroturfing campaigns and paid influencer programs are common tools.
platforms and ecosystems: Social media platforms, search engines, and content aggregators can become battlegrounds. Operators exploit algorithmic amplification, trending mechanisms, and user engagement patterns to extend reach; see algorithmic transparency and social media for related discussions.
techniques in use: inauthentic accounts (often algorithmically coordinated), fake news, manipulated media, misinformation designed to feign credibility, and targeted messaging tailored to audiences’ beliefs or emotions. See bot for automated amplification and sockpuppet for deceptive personas.

Elections, governance, and policy implications

Influence operations have raised concerns about the integrity of elections, public trust in institutions, and the functioning of liberal democracy. Campaigns to sway voters or shape policy debates can occur in high-stakes environments such as national elections, referenda, and parliamentary processes. Contemporary debates address several core questions:

How to defend electoral processes without unduly restricting speech: Safeguards need to protect vote integrity and the credibility of information while preserving civil liberties and open debate.
Platform accountability vs. free expression: There is discussion about whether platforms should take stronger action against inauthentic behavior and misinformation, and how to balance transparency with privacy and due process.
Public resilience and media literacy: Educating the public to recognize manipulation, verify sources, and understand how online information can be engineered is viewed as a foundational defense.
Attribution and proportionate response: Determining who is responsible, whether actions constitute aggression, and what response is appropriate (public attribution, sanctions, or counter-messaging) remains contentious.
Domestic vs foreign responsibilities: Distinctions between homegrown political persuasion and externally sponsored influence shape policy choices about regulation, diplomacy, and national security.

Policy responses and debates often emphasize a mix of defenses, including improved election security, disclosure of political advertising, transparency about algorithmic amplification, and investment in media literacy. See election security and disinformation for related topics, as well as Cambridge Analytica in discussions about data-driven political operations.

Controversies and debates from a practical perspective

Proponents of a robust defensive stance argue that liberal democracies must shield themselves from covert manipulation, uphold the integrity of elections, and ensure that public discourse is not hijacked by hidden actors. They commonly advocate for targeted interventions that protect key processes and institutions, while resisting blanket censorship that could chill legitimate political speech.

Critics of expansive counter-disinformation regimes warn about risks to civil liberties, potential bias in enforcement, and the danger of undermining legitimate political debate under a broad banner of “misinformation.” They emphasize market-driven platform governance, voluntary transparency, and the importance of free inquiry. They also argue that some critiques of influence operations are used to push cultural or political narratives that themselves amount to governance by credentialed elites, rather than encouraging a robust, pluralistic information environment.

From a more skeptical angle, some commentators contend that much of the fear surrounding influence operations is overstated relative to other political risks, or that it can be exploited to justify excessive censorship or surveillance. They highlight examples where calls to suppress information have been framed in technocratic terms, yet end up marginalizing dissenting voices or fogging important debates with technocratic jargon. In practice, the balance between countering manipulation and preserving open speech remains a central dispute among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners.

Woke criticisms of influence operations often focus on how power dynamics and control of platforms shape what counts as legitimate information. In this view, concerns about manipulation can be channeled into sweeping reforms that critics argue amount to censorship or ideological gatekeeping. Proponents of this perspective counter that preserving trust in elections and institutions requires concrete steps to deter covert influence, while maintaining robust protections for political speech. The debate centers on where to draw lines, what mechanisms are proportionate and transparent, and how to measure effectiveness without undermining democratic norms.

Case studies and historical notes

2016 United States elections: Foreign actors sought to influence public opinion and election discourse through inauthentic social media activity and other channels. See Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections for a detailed account.
European discussions around the Brexit referendum and related campaigns: Allegations of cross-border influence operations and data-driven political outreach have been part of ongoing analyses, with references to Brexit and associated inquiries.
China’s and other states’ influence efforts: Studies discuss how state-backed information campaigns, sometimes categorized under the United Front work framework, aim to shape perceptions in multiple countries. See United Front Work Department for background.
Private sector and data-driven campaigns: The rise of analytics-driven political consulting, including high-profile cases like Cambridge Analytica, has raised questions about how data informs influence operations and what transparency is required.