Erich Von FalkenhaynEdit
Erich von Falkenhayn was a central figure in the German war leadership during the opening years of the First World War. As chief of the German General Staff from late 1914 until his dismissal in 1916, he shaped the strategic thinking behind Germany’s Western Front effort and the decision to wage a protracted, high-cost assault that aimed to break the French resolve and relieve pressure on the Eastern Front. His tenure is remembered for a bold, if controversial, attempt to decide the war through attrition and for the huge human costs that followed from the Battle of Verdun. Falkenhayn’s influence waned after the Verdun offensive failed to deliver a decisive victory, and his removal paved the way for the rise of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, whose approaches would dominate German strategy for the remainder of the war.
Early life and career
Erich von Falkenhayn was born into a Prussian noble family in 1861. He joined the imperial German army and advanced through the staff system that underpinned German military theory in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. His career path placed him among the army’s professional planners and staff officers, familiar with the operational and logistical demands of modern war. By the outbreak of World War I, Falkenhayn had built a reputation for methodical planning and a belief in the capacity of German military organization to sustain long campaigns. His experience equipped him to take command of strategic decisions at the highest level when the war intensified in 1914.
In the early months of the conflict, Falkenhayn rose to the position of chief of the German General Staff, a post that gave him responsibility for coordinating overall strategy on the Western and Eastern fronts. He assumed this role in the wake of the initial German mobilization and the early successes that followed the rapid movement into Belgium and northern France. The war’s early phases demanded not only battlefield leadership but a comprehensive plan to interlock operations across theaters of war, a challenge Falkenhayn undertook with the aim of preserving German manpower and sustaining the war machine.
World War I leadership and the Verdun decision
As chief of the General Staff, Falkenhayn sought a strategy that could crack the delicate balance of the Western Front without overextending Germany’s reserves. He believed that victory would come through strategic pressure that would force the Allies to commit vast resources while Germany conserved its own strength. This line of thinking culminated in the decision to launch a major offensive at Verdun in 1916. The goal was to inflict unsustainable losses on the French army and to compel France to “bleed” itself dry while German forces held the line more or less in place.
The Verdun attack was ambitious in its scale and audacity. Falkenhayn argued that by concentrating effort on a fortress-city with symbolic significance and a vast network of fortifications, Germany could trigger a war of attrition that would exhaust French resolve and shorten the war overall. The operation drew in substantial French and German forces, leading to unprecedented casualties on both sides. In his view, Verdun offered the best chance to disrupt the Allied political and military will and to force a strategic breakthrough that could yield a favorable balance of power on the Western Front.
From a right-of-center perspective, supporters of Falkenhayn emphasize his insistence on disciplined, planned warfare and the belief that limited, decisive operations could determine the outcome of a war that otherwise risked dragging on indefinitely. They point to the political and military pressures of the time, including the need to protect the Eastern Front and the German domestic economy, as reasons for his emphasis on attrition and efficiency. The Verdun decision is thus framed not as a reckless gamble, but as a calculated, responsible gamble rooted in the constraints and aims of a society mobilized for total war.
The Verdun campaign produced extraordinary casualties and heavy material costs with no clear Allied collapse. Critics, especially from later generations, describe Verdun as a costly stalemate that exhausted German manpower and diverted resources from other fronts, contributing to a broader strategic drift. Proponents of Falkenhayn’s approach argue that Verdun forced the Allies to commit vast resources to a prolonged defense, thereby easing pressure elsewhere, even if the result was not a swift, decisive German victory. In any case, Verdun became the defining test of Falkenhayn’s strategy and a focal point for debates about the pros and cons of attritional warfare on the Western Front.
Verdun and attrition warfare
Verdun (February–December 1916) stands as the most consequential episode of Falkenhayn’s tenure. The operation sought to break French morale and to compel a French surrender or capitulation through sustained losses. The tactic leaned on attrition—wearing down an opponent through sustained, costly engagements—while maintaining German stamina and supply lines. The campaign was supported by the broader German war effort, including considerations of relief for the Eastern Front and the preservation of German military manpower for future operations.
From a critical historical perspective, Verdun is often cited as a stark example of attrition warfare’s human cost. The German and French armies both suffered grievous losses, and the campaign did not deliver the decisive breakthrough that German planners had anticipated. The failure to secure a rapid victory at Verdun contributed to mounting pressure on the German high command and helped precipitate the leadership change that brought Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the center of the war effort. In the assessment of many historians, Verdun’s audacity did not translate into a sustainable strategic advantage for Germany, and the wasteful expenditure of lives weighed heavily on the German home front and war-weariness.
Supporters of Falkenhayn’s approach emphasize that attrition-style warfare was a rational response to the strategic constraints faced by Germany in 1916. They argue that Verdun succeeded in tying down large French forces, draining Allied reserves, and forcing the Allies into a protracted campaign of defense that carried political and military costs for Paris and London. They also highlight that the German General Staff sought to balance the demands of the Western Front with the pressures on the Eastern Front, attempting to preserve enough strength to contest both theaters. The Verdun episode remains a central case study in debates about whether attrition can be a legitimate strategic tool in modern war, and whether the costs can be justified by anticipated political or military gains.
The controversy surrounding Verdun reflects broader questions about the ethics and prudence of total-war planning. Critics from later generations argue that the human toll overshadowed any strategic gains and that more efficient or less costly alternatives might have achieved similar aims. Proponents counter that the war’s total nature demanded difficult choices and that Verdun exposed the Allies’ vulnerabilities, forcing them to fight harder and longer than they might have otherwise. From a traditional, order-minded viewpoint, Falkenhayn’s restraint in committing German society to an open-ended campaign can be read as discipline and realism in a chaotic strategic environment.
Later career and personal reflection
After Verdun, the momentum in German strategic leadership shifted. Falkenhayn remained a central figure but found his authority constrained by the ascent of a different leadership team on the German side. The appointment of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to the highest war command in 1916 marked a turning point in German strategy, with the new leadership emphasizing a more centralized, aggressive approach to the Western Front and a strengthened war economy. Falkenhayn’s influence diminished as the war progressed, and the subsequent phases of the conflict unfolded under the direction of these later commanders.
In the years following his service as chief of the General Staff, Falkenhayn lived through the postwar period, during which Germany confronted upheaval, political change, and the consequences of a war that had deeply reshaped the European order. His writings and analyses continued to be consulted by students of military theory and by observers seeking to understand the logic of strategic decision-making in a total war context. His career illustrates the tension between strategic theory and the brutal realities of battlefield outcomes, a tension that has persisted in military thinking to this day.
Controversies and debates
The legacy of Falkenhayn invites vigorous debate, particularly among historians who assess the practicality and morality of attrition as a means to victory. Supporters argue that his decisions reflected a sober assessment of Germany’s strategic position and a willingness to take calculated risks to avert a longer, possibly more costly war. They maintain that Verdun, though costly, was intended to compel the French to expend resources and to shift Allied attention away from other potential focal points, thereby shaping the overall balance of power on the Western Front.
Critics view Verdun as a strategic miscalculation that inflicted enormous losses without delivering a decisive advantage. They contend that the campaign tied down German resources in a protracted contest that failed to break the Allied alliance or to deliver the quick strategic reset needed for a favorable conclusion to the war. They also point to the moral and human consequences of such campaigns, arguing that the indiscriminate destruction of life and property in civilian areas and front-line combat eroded support for the war on all sides. From a more conservative or traditional lens, the debate centers on whether war aims justified the means and whether bold long-term strategy can justify the immediate suffering and resource depletion it caused.
From a right-of-center perspective, the discussion of Falkenhayn’s approach often emphasizes discipline, organizational competence, and strategic realism. Critics who label the critique of Verdun as misguided sometimes argue that opponents misinterpret the constraints of total war or apply present-day norms anachronistically to the decisions of 1914–1916. They may contend that the German high command acted within the political and military realities of the time, and that the attempt to force a decisive outcome through attrition was a legitimate response to the Allied coalition’s strength and the necessity of preserving German war-making capacity. The conversation around Falkenhayn’s tactics thus reflects enduring questions about how best to translate strategic theory into effective, proportionate military action under the pressures of modern, industrialized war.
Legacy
Erich von Falkenhayn’s tenure as the head of Germany’s General Staff left a lasting imprint on how leaders thought about strategic risk, resource management, and the feasibility of decisive campaigns on a war-ravaged front. Verdun, as the defining episode of his strategy, remains a focal point for assessments of attrition warfare and the value—and the limits—of attempting to dictate an entire war through a single, monumental operation. The subsequent shift in German war leadership under Hindenburg and Ludendorff is often seen as the pivot from a more calculated form of strategic planning toward a more centralized and aggressive war effort, with Falkenhayn’s approach serving as a reference point for debates about what could have been done differently.
The historical appraisal of Falkenhayn continues to be nuanced. Supporters emphasize his methodical mindset, his willingness to assume strategic risk in defense of Germany’s broader war aims, and his attempt to structure a war economy around a central strategic idea. Critics stress the human cost, the opportunity costs of Verdun, and the strategic limits of attrition-based campaigns. Both strands contribute to a broader understanding of German statecraft and military doctrine during a formative period in modern warfare.