Broken AuthenticationEdit
Broken authentication refers to weaknesses in the way systems verify who a user claims to be and how they manage a user’s session after login. This broad class of vulnerabilities includes insecure credential storage, weak or abused password reset flows, tokens that are stored or transmitted insecurely, and poor session management that allows attackers to impersonate legitimate users. It is a perennial risk for online services because authentication is the gateway to personal data, financial information, and critical infrastructure. Industry assessments place broken authentication among the most important threats in modern software, and it remains a central focus of hardening efforts across web apps, mobile apps, and APIs. OWASP Top 10
Because authentication and session state are so central to trust online, even small weaknesses can scale into large breaches. When attackers can impersonate real users, they can fraudulently access accounts, exfiltrate data, or commit identity-based crimes at scale. The problem is not limited to any one sector; financial services, healthcare, e-commerce, and government services all face this risk. The typical attack surface spans client code, server-side logic, and the tokens or cookies that bridge the two, making broken authentication a shared concern of developers, operators, and security teams. Credential stuffing Password reuse
Definition and scope
Broken authentication covers the lifecycle from credential creation and storage to how sessions are established, renewed, and terminated. It includes how passwords are created and validated, how password reset and account recovery flows operate, how tokens are issued and stored, and how sessions are protected against hijacking or fixation. In practice, the term encompasses flaws in how:
- user credentials are stored and verified, including weak hashing or improper password storage practices; Password hashing is a core defense here
- password reset and account recovery flows are protected from abuse; Password reset
- session tokens or cookies are generated, transmitted, and invalidated; improper session management enables hijacking or fixation
- API tokens and OAuth/OpenID Connect flows are secured, and tokens are protected in storage and transit; OAuth 2.0 OpenID Connect SAML
- multi-factor authentication is implemented and resistant to common bypasses; MFA WebAuthn are examples
- developers and operators monitor, detect, and respond to anomalous login behavior; SIEM and related practices help here
Attacks in this space are often data-driven and opportunistic, leveraging leaked credentials from one service to break into another, or exploiting weak recovery processes to take over accounts. They are especially potent when users reuse passwords across multiple sites, making credential stuffing a common tactic. Credential stuffing Password reuse
Threat vectors
Credential stuffing and password reuse
Attackers reuse leaked credentials against thousands of sites, banking on the inevitability of some users employing the same password across services. Automated tools test large lists of credentials, often succeeding where protections are weak or poorly monitored. Strong hashing of stored credentials, rate-limiting, and robust monitoring help mitigate these risks, but the most durable defense is eliminating password reliance where feasible. Credential stuffing Password reuse
Weak password reset and recovery flows
If identity verification during password resets is lax, attackers can reset credentials for legitimate accounts and gain access. Secure recovery usually requires out-of-band verification, device-bound checks, or trusted channels, and it should minimize social engineering risk. Password reset
Insecure session management and token handling
Session hijacking, fixation, or token leakage can give attackers authenticated access without credential knowledge. Secure design includes short-lived session tokens, secure cookies, proper invalidation on logout, and careful handling of token refresh flows. Session management JSON Web Token
MFA vulnerabilities and phishing
While MFA dramatically improves protection, not all methods are equally strong. SMS-based codes, for example, are vulnerable to SIM swapping and interception. Phishing-resistant mechanisms such as passwordless options and hardware-based credentials provide stronger protection. Multi-Factor Authentication WebAuthn
API exposure and third-party access
APIs and delegated access tokens can leak if not properly scoped, logged, and rotated. Misuse of OAuth tokens or insecure token storage on clients can lead to unauthorized access. OAuth 2.0 OpenID Connect
Device and platform risks
Weak device trust, shared devices, or insecure local storage can undermine authentication. Mobile app code and platform-specific interception risks require careful defense-in-depth and platform-aware controls. Mobile security
Mitigation and best practices
A defensible approach to broken authentication blends identity design, secure implementation, and operational discipline. Core strategies include:
- Strengthen credential handling: store passwords with modern, memory-hard hashing algorithms (e.g., Argon2, bcrypt, scrypt) and avoid deprecated methods. Password hashing Argon2 bcrypt
- Move toward passwordless or phishing-resistant authentication: deploy WebAuthn/FIDO2, hardware security keys, and other phishing-resistant factors. WebAuthn FIDO2
- Limit reliance on passwords: adopt risk-based or adaptive authentication to require stronger checks only when risk is elevated. Risk-based authentication
- Harden MFA with resilient methods: prefer hardware keys and app-based authenticators over SMS-based or push-notification factors when possible. MFA
- Improve session hygiene: use secure cookies, same-site controls, short session lifetimes, and robust logout processes to invalidate sessions promptly. Session management
- Secure tokens and APIs: enforce short-lived tokens with secure storage, protect refresh tokens, and minimize token exposure in client apps. JSON Web Token
- Enforce robust identity verification for resets: design password reset flows that verify identity through multiple checks and trusted channels. Password reset
- Monitor and respond: implement logging, anomaly detection, and rapid response to suspicious login activity. SIEM
- Use recognized standards and open standards: leverage established identity protocols (OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect) and security baselines. OAuth 2.0 OpenID Connect SAML
- Privacy and usability balance: design authentication that respects user privacy while maintaining security, and reduce friction with usable security practices. Risk-based authentication
Market dynamics and policy landscape
From a practical, business-oriented standpoint, security features that protect users also protect a company’s value and reputation. A market-driven approach emphasizes clear liability for security failures, consumer choice, and competition as primary incentives for firms to invest in robust authentication. Regulation should aim for baseline protections without stifling innovation or imposing excessive costs on small enterprises. Recognized frameworks and standards—such as PCI DSS in payment processing, NIST SP 800-63 for digital identity, and privacy laws that require breach notification—provide structure without unduly hampering technological progress. Data breach notification
Critics sometimes argue that prescriptive security mandates can hinder innovation, especially for smaller firms or startups competing with larger incumbents. Proponents of a more flexible, risk-based approach counter that reasonable safeguards help prevent systemic risks without squelching new products. The debate often touches on how to balance privacy, security, and throughput of user experiences. Some critics frame security requirements as tools for broader political agendas; from a practical perspective, the core issue is reducing harm and enabling legitimate, efficient access to services. Those who dismiss such critiques as “woke” or misguided typically emphasize that effective security is a prerequisite for trust, economic growth, and broad access to digital services, and that policy should reward demonstrable risk reduction rather than enforce broad, one-size-fits-all mandates.
Controversies commonly discussed include how to align security standards with small-business realities, how much verifying identity should rely on user-provided information, and how to keep up with rapidly evolving attack methods while preserving user-friendly experiences. The central point is that practical security design—layered defenses, threat modeling, and ongoing testing—remains essential regardless of broader political debates. Penetration testing